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 ABSTRACT 
 
Food safety is an important public health issue.  Product recalls are an important part of the 
overall food safety system and occur when potentially unsafe products enter the marketplace.  
However, it is important that information about the recall ultimately reaches the public.  This 
research assesses the publicity that recalls receive by the popular media.  The focus is 
specifically on recalls of meat and poultry products.  Publicity is measured by coverage in the 
AP Newswire.  Data were gathered from the United States Department of Agriculture’s Food 
Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) and cover meat and poultry recalls from 1982 to 2009.  
These data were then matched to stories on product recalls from the AP Newswire to arrive at 
article counts for each recall event.  The data compiled indicate that roughly 25 percent of meat 
and poultry recalls receive at least one story in the Newswire.  Count data models were 
estimated to identify characteristics that make a meat and/or poultry recall event more likely to 
be publicized.  Article counts were expressed as a function of recall characteristics.  In 
particular, this study utilized the zero-inflated negative binomial and zero-inflated Poisson 
models.  Results suggest that the volume of product recalled is a major driver of media 
coverage.  Large recalls are more likely to receive coverage and are covered more intensively 
than small-volume recalls.  In addition, recalls due to the presence of pathogens, especially E. 
coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes, receive more publicity than recalls for other 
reasons.  When the problem was discovered by the FSIS, recall events are more frequently 
covered by the AP Newswire.  No significant differences in coverage were observed by the day 
of the week a recall is announced. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Food safety is been an increasing concern among consumers and food producers over the 
years and perceptions of this issue are enhanced as new cases of foodborne illnesses take place 
and are publicized.  Since the early 1980s there has been an increase in incidents of illness and 
outbreaks linked to emerging pathogens.  For instance, according to the Centers for Disease and 
Control and Prevention (CDC), the first US case of listeriosis linked to the consumption of 
meat and poultry products was in 1989.  Nowadays, such events have become more frequent 
and, in some cases, more deadly.  As I was in the process of writing this thesis, there were two 
high profile examples food safety events.  Most recently was an outbreak of Salmonella 
Heidelberg infections affecting 78 persons in 26 US states.  This was linked to ground turkey 
meat produced by Springdale, AR based Cargill Meat Solutions and resulted in a 36 million 
pound product recall on August 3, 2011 (FSIS 2011).  Earlier, in May 2011, food safety was in 
the headlines because of an outbreak tied to a novel and aggressive strain of Escherichia coli 
(E. coli), which struck mainly Germany and 13 other countries in Europe, was responsible for 
4,075 cases of illnesses and 50 deaths (World Health Organization 2011), and is believed to 
have been linked to bean sprouts.  
A major focus in the existing literature is on the effects of recalls on the company’s equity 
returns (Pruitt and Peterson 1986; Thomsen and McKenzie 2001; Salin and Hooker 2001; 
Wang et al. 2002; Chu, Lin, and Prather 2005), the impact of recalls on resale prices and sales 
volume (Hartman 1987; Thomsen, Shiptsova, and Hamm 2006), and how to communicate and 
manage the crisis that a recall represents to the firm (Miller and Littlefield 2010; Greyser 2009; 
Jolly and Mowen 1985; Hooker, Teratanavat, and Salin 2005; Souiden and Pons 2009).  
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My focus is a bit different in that I address the publicity that meat and poultry recalls 
receive through the news media.  Specifically, the objective of my research is to identify the 
characteristics of meat and poultry recalls that affect the likelihood and amount of media 
coverage.  This topic is important because the news media are the primary venue by which 
consumers learn about product recalls.  While there have been very highly publicized food 
recalls, my research suggests that the majority of meat and poultry recalls receive very little 
coverage, even when they involve serious health hazards.  My study examines nearly three 
decades of stories about meat and poultry recalls appearing on the Associated Press Newswire. 
 
Meat and Poultry Recalls in the USA 
The Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is an agency within the US Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) that is responsible for the regulating safety of meat and poultry products.  
FSIS supervises product recalls.  According to FSIS directive 8080.1 Revision 6 (U.S. 
Department of Agriculture 2010), a recall is the process whereby a firm removes meat or 
poultry products from commercialization, after they have been placed into the food distribution 
system.  This action occurs when there is reason to believe the products are misbranded or 
adulterated under terms of the Federal Meat Inspection Act or the Poultry Products Inspection 
Act and pose a health hazard to the public.  The recall is a voluntary action of the company.  
When FSIS learns about the tainted products, it can recommend that the company perform a 
recall.  However, the company decides whether to follow FSIS recommendations.  If a 
company chooses not to comply with a request for a product recall, FSIS utilizes other 
mechanisms to ensure the consumer’s safety.  The agency can remove the product from 
commerce and issue press releases to inform consumers of the potential health hazards 
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associated with the suspect product.  FSIS releases public health alerts instead of recalls when 
products are no longer available for sale in retail stores, but there is a reason to believe they 
might still be in consumers’ possession (FSIS 2008).  The agency also utilizes this tool when a 
foodborne illness outbreak is ongoing but cannot be linked to a specific product and company. 
FSIS is involved in the recall process jointly with the firm.  When a recall takes place, the 
company is in charge of creating and employing an “effective recall strategy” (U.S. Department 
of Agriculture 2010) which is used to inform the consignees of the necessity of withdrawing 
recalled product for the market.  FSIS investigates the effectiveness of the firm’s strategy and 
its execution of the product recall.  Again, the agency has authority to take further actions such 
as issuance of public health alerts or to intervene with detentions and seizures of contaminated 
products in order to decrease the risk to the public when a company does not properly remove 
the recalled products from commerce.  FSIS closes recalls upon complete removal of recalled 
product from commerce and evidence of no further illnesses related to the product. 
FSIS classifies recalls based on the severity of health hazards presented by the product 
being considered for recall.  The recall can be classified as class I, which involves hazards with 
the potential to cause serious health consequences or death; class II recalls are for products that 
present a small chance of causing adverse health consequences when consumed; and class III 
recalls are assigned to cases where use of the product does not present adverse health 
consequences for the consumer.  FSIS usually does not issue press releases for recalls under 
class III. 
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Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Recalls target consumer safety, but the negative impacts to the recalling companies has 
been intensively described in the literature (some of which is cited above).  Nash (2010) 
mentions the high cost of the recall, which can include indirect and direct costs, lawsuits and 
fines.  However, the indirect costs are usually difficult to quantify.  Recalls represent a major 
negative impact not only for the recalling company but can shake consumer confidence in the 
safety of the food supply.  Stinson et al. (2008) find that consumers’ confidence in food safety 
and food defense decreases after a major national recall.  All these harmful consequences of the 
recall likely provide incentives for companies to maintain safety of their products (Nash 2010). 
Although FSIS issues press releases, there is no guarantee that these announcements will 
reach the broader population.  The media covers in fairly great detail cases in which illness 
outbreaks are involved, as seen in this summer’s Salmonella event.  However, recalls related to 
outbreaks account for just a portion of the meat and poultry recalls announced by FSIS.  In 
order to guarantee consumers’ safety and to improve removal of recalled products from the 
market and households, it is important that recall information ultimately reaches the public. 
The objective of this study, as mentioned before, is to identify characteristics that make a 
meat and/or poultry recall event more likely to be publicized.  To meet this objective, I 
analyzed articles appearing in the AP Newswire and developed article counts for each recall 
contained in FSIS records from 1982 to 2009.  Based on the literature review presented in the 
next chapter and descriptive analyses of my data, the hypotheses to be tested revolve around 
characteristics of a meat or poultry recalls and whether they impact the amount of coverage in 
the Newswire.  Specifically, the null hypotheses are that characteristics of recalls such as size 
of the recall (volume of product recalled), reason for the recall, and entity discovering the 
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problem leading to the recall does not change either the likelihood of the recall event being 
published in the AP Newswire nor the number of Newswire articles devoted to the recall case.  
I expect that these null hypotheses will be rejected in favor of the following alternative 
hypotheses: 
1. Recalls accounting for large volumes of products will be more frequently publicized. 
2. Meat and poultry products recalled due to presence of pathogens are more likely to be 
published and receive greater amounts of coverage than recalls for other reasons.  
3. Recalls for problems discovered by governmental entities will be more likely to 
receive coverage than will recalls for problems discovered by the company. 
I also explore whether there is the potential to influence coverage by timing the recall 
announcement.  Specifically, I examine whether recalls announced on Fridays, at the end of the 
weekly news cycle, receive less coverage than recalls announced on other weekdays.  I address 
these hypotheses through count data models where article counts are modeled as a function of 
recall characteristics. 
 
Organization of this Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.  In chapter 2, I review pertinent articles 
available in the literature.  Chapter 3 presents a detailed description of my data collection 
process and an examination of key features of the data set that was compiled for analysis.  
Chapter 4 describes the count data models employed in the thesis.  In chapter 5, the main 
empirical results are presented and explained.  Finally, chapter 6 concludes with a summary of 
the main findings, a discussion of limitations of the research, and suggestions for future studies. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Stock Prices and Market Response 
The negative consequences of a product recalls for companies are widely discussed in the 
literature.  For public traded companies, a variety of the studies focus on the impact of product 
recalls on the company’s stock returns.  Reasons for is research include availability of data and 
the importance of the subject to shareholders and investors.  Pruitt and Peterson (1986), 
Thomsen and McKenzie (2001), Salin and Hooker (2001), Wang et al. (2002), and Chu, Lin, 
and Prather (2005) have measured responses in stock returns to product recalls.  Pruitt and 
Peterson (1986) examine, using an event study, the impact of non-automotive product recalls 
on equity holders of the recalling firm.  Their study used recall data from January 1968 to 
December 1983 from the Wall Street Journal Index and the companies’ daily stock returns 
from the Center for Research in Security Prices at the University of Chicago.  They find that 
recall announcements generate negative abnormal returns that persist for roughly two months 
after the recall is publicized.  The results suggest that the market perceived the recall 
announcement as adverse and unpredicted event.  They also find evidence that in percentage 
terms, the stock prices of larger companies declined less than the stock prices of smaller 
companies
1
 over the post recall period. In addition, they argue that the adverse stock price 
responses can be explained only partially by the direct cost of the recall.  Chu, Lin, and Prather 
(2005) conduct a follow-up study to Pruitt and Peterson (1986) and add data from 1984 to 
                                                             
1
 The authors classified the companies by size, multiplying the outstanding shares by the price 
per share of each company. The size classifications were: over $1 billion for the largest firms, 
from $250 million to $1 billion for the median sized firms, and below $250 million for the 
smallest. The largest companies presented a mean abnormal return of -0.591 percent, whereas 
the smallest had -4.145 percent. 
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2003.  They call attention to the significant increase in the number of recalls.  As in Pruitt and 
Peterson (1986), these authors indicate that the product recall announcements have a negative 
effect for equity holders.  Negative abnormal returns are observed on the day before and day of 
publication in the Wall Street Journal.  However, the mean cumulative abnormal return is not 
statistically significant before or after the Journal’s publication.  Additionally, they show that 
firms with larger market value (more than US$1 billion) experienced a greater number of recall 
events.  They analyzed datasets for each industry separately and found that stock prices of 
companies in drugs and cosmetics or toys and appliances were more sensitive to recall 
announcements. 
Numerous recall studies have used automobile recalls as the research subject.  I am largely 
avoiding these articles in this review because of the lack of similarity to meat and poultry.  
However, two of these studies warrant mention.  Hartman (1987) provides insight on the 
consequences of new information about product safety and the presence of cross-product 
effects during recall events.  Rupp (2001) addresses whether the effect of a recall depends on 
the entity initiating the recall.  Hartman (1987) uses a hedonic model to access the impact of the 
new safety information on the resale price of 1980 model-year cars in the American resale 
market from 1981 to 1985.  He chooses this particular model year because it was subject of 
safety recall, and it was also the launching period of General Motors’ X cars, which were 
marketed as high quality cars and were of specific interest in Hartman’s (1987) study.  The car 
sample collected was 190 domestic and imported makes/models.  He finds that a recall 
negatively affects the resale value of recalled cars; however it has no influence in the value of 
the manufacturer’s non-recalled products (cross-product effect).  The magnitude of the negative 
effect is different based on the class of the car, nature of the defect, and severity of the recall.  
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Specifically based on the X cars, which experienced two recalls due to brake defects, Hartman 
(1987) finds that the resale price dropped 14% after the recall. In addition, he affirms the 
market responded rapidly to the new quality information contained in the recalls. 
Rupp (2001) used the word “initiator” to designate which entity first discovered the safety 
problem and compares the stock market response when the recall of an automobile was 
initiated by the government or by the company.  The study assesses abnormal returns from 
1973 to 1998 of major automobile companies in the US.  He uses recall announcement data 
from the Wall Street Journal Index and compares them with data provided by the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, which retains the industry’s safety recall information.  
He also collects stock price data from the Center for Research in Security Prices at the 
University of Chicago (data on Japanese companies were available in the form of American 
Depository Receipts).  From the 734 recalls published in the Wall Street Journal Index, the 
government initiated 208 and the companies initiated 526 recalls.  The government initiated 
recalls tended to be larger in volume.  Rupp (2001) discovers that government initiated 
automotive recalls did not lead to larger shareholder losses (equity loss) when compared to the 
manufacturer initiated recalls.  This is contrary to his a priori hypothesis. 
Because my research focus is on meat and poultry recalls, I looked for studies addressing 
the meat sector.  Thomsen and McKenzie (2001) used an event study of the meat and poultry 
recalls from 1982 to 1998 and their impact on the stock prices of the recalling companies.  
Their recall data were gathered from FSIS and security price data were collected from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices at the University of Chicago.  They find a negative 
abnormal returns for the most serious class I recalls (class I according to the FSIS 
classification) that persisted for at least a month after the recall announcement.  This was fairly 
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consistent with the findings of Pruitt and Peterson (1986).  Other recalls classified as less 
severe threats to consumer health (class II and class III) showed no statistically significant 
effect on security price returns.  Salin and Hooker (2001) and Wang et al. (2002) evaluated the 
stock return and the stock price volatility after food recall incidents for specific firms.  Salin 
and Hooker (2001) assess recalls by Sara Lee, IBP, and Odwalla and include a total of four 
recall events in their study.  The authors justify the selection of these companies because they 
vary in size, volume of product recalled and reports of illnesses or death related to recalled 
products, and the diversity of business.  In addition, two of the recall events they analyzed 
prompted policy reforms.  They find stock in Odwalla had a significant drop on the recall day, 
and abnormal returns were seen for 10 days after the event.  For Sara Lee, no significant 
abnormal return was detected.  Two IBP recalls were examined.  The first recall generated a 
negative reaction in the stock market, with cumulative abnormal returns been noticed for at 
least the 40 days post-event.  The second recall presented no statistically significant effect.  In 
the riskiness of returns analyses, Sara Lee showed higher volatility in its returns after the recall.  
However, the capital asset pricing model presented no change in risk after the event.  The IBP 
first recall generated an increase in volatility as well, with no change in risk.  The second recall 
from IBP showed a decrease in volatility and a decline in risk.  Odwalla also exhibited higher 
volatility after the recall and no change in nondiversifiable risk.  Finally they assert that 
financial markets responded in different intensity to these food recalls events and that the stock 
price reaction after the recall could not be related to the severity of food contamination in the 
study.  
Wang et al. (2002) conducted a similar study, focusing on recalls events of two specific 
companies due to bacterial contamination, albeit with a different econometric approach.  They 
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used a Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model to evaluate 
stock prices responses from Sara Lee and IBP after food recalls.  A total of five recall events 
(three from IBP and two from Sara Lee) happened during their study period.  The authors find 
that the first recall for both companies had a significant adverse effect on the stock returns 
around the recall announcement days.  Also, the first recall amplified the recalling company’s 
stock returns volatility and that of the other company.  The results indicate the market had a 
lower reaction to subsequent recalls.  The first recall from Sara Lee presented the largest 
correlation between the two companies’ stocks.  Finally, they assert that investors’ response to 
the food recalls present incentives to the private sector to pursue food safety measures. 
In summary, a product recall most likely will cause a negative impact in stock prices and an 
increase in volatility of returns.  These have direct implications to shareholders and investors 
and might pressure publicly traded companies to pursue higher standards and invest in product 
quality and food safety.  These market responses may also encourage companies to prepare for 
crisis management and crisis communications. 
The majority of the meat and poultry recalls is associated with a specific company or brand, 
which is indicated in the FSIS’s press release.  This is useful information to consumers and 
enables them to identify the product being recalled.  Thomsen, Shiptsova, and Hamm (2006) 
assess the impact on the product sales of the recalling firm.  They examine frankfurter recalls 
due to the presence of the pathogen Listeria monocytogenes and assess the impact on the 
recalling brand’s sales.  They also evaluate the sales of other frankfurter brands not involved in 
a recall.  In addition, they report on brand recovery patterns following the recall.  The authors 
gathered the frankfurter retail sales data from Information Resources, Inc.’s InfoScan database 
from November 1998 to December 2000.  The recall data were obtained from FSIS and 
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matched by date, brand, and market with the retail sales data.  They find that recalls had a 
negative impact on sales for the recalled brands.  The sales drop was, on average, 22 percent 
during the period of the recall announcement and 4 weeks thereafter.  However, there was no 
adverse impact on the sales of other brands which are not involved in the recall.  Some of the 
competing brands actually had a slight increase in sales.  Thus, consumers tended to view the 
recall as a brand-level problem that did not adversely affect other brands in the frankfurter 
category.  They find that brand sales began to recover 8 to 12 weeks after the recall 
announcement and returned to pre-recall levels within 4 to 5 months. 
 
Crisis Management and Communication 
A product recall results from a product defect or contamination, which is considered a crisis 
for the producing company or distributor (Miller and Littlefield 2010).  The negative impact of 
a recall incident to the company is the result of different aspects of the recall itself and the way 
the firm handles the problem, specifically its communication strategies.  Miller and Littlefield 
(2010) examined the different communication strategies used by ConAgra in two different food 
recall events through a content analysis, and assess whether the company exhibited 
organizational learning in their handling of these crises.  They collected data from major 
American newspaper and wire services, using the database Lexis Nexis, from September 2006 
to September 2008 to access the coverage of a peanut butter and pot pie recall experienced by 
the company.  They find evidence that the company exhibited different behavior across the two 
events before, during, and after the crisis periods.  They give specific attention to the lack of 
organizational learning in between the first and second recall.  They conclude that ConAgra did 
not show organizational learning on the second recall and did not apply the best practices with 
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the same efficiency as the company had done in the first recall.  In the earlier peanut butter 
recall, the company focused in the consumer safety, issuing a recall quickly, and making 
meaningful efforts to communicate information to consumers.  According to the authors, the 
communication in the later pot pie recall seemed to target image restoration instead of 
consumer safety. 
For consumers, safety is a basic attribute of a food product.  Thus, when a food product is 
recalled, the product has failed.  According to Greyser (2009), product failures are one cause of 
a corporate brand crisis.  Other causes of corporate brand crises are: social responsibility gaps, 
corporate misbehavior, executive misbehavior, poor business results, spokesperson controversy 
or misbehavior, death of an individual symbolizing the company, loss of public support, and 
controversial ownership (Greyser 2009, p. 591).  Cleary a product failure, if handled 
inappropriately can lead to other types of crises such as perceived social responsibility gaps, 
perceptions of corporate or executive misbehavior, and losses of public support.  Greyser 
(2009) asserts that in crises events, the organization’s behavior history plays a significant role 
in protecting and building reputation.  In particular, effective organizational communication is 
very important.  Greyser (2009) argues that the foundation of trust is usually the base for an 
effective communication and states that trust is a result of a company’s “performance, 
behavior, and supportable communication, and is a foundation of authenticity and reputation” 
(Greyser 2009, p. 596). 
In the case of an ongoing crisis, the firm’s strategy for best managing the crisis should be 
admitting the problem, attempting to solve the issue, and using plausible behavior responses, 
always through reliable communication, according to Greyser (2009).  As mentioned before, 
this was one of the failures of ConAgra during its pot pie recall (Miller and Littlefield 2010).  
 13 
In addition, he emphasizes the larger interest of the media on the company’s response when in 
a crisis situation. 
One should expect, based on Greyser’s (2009) assertions, that every meat or poultry recall, 
when classified as a high hazard to consumer health, would negatively impact the recalling 
company’s reputation or the specific brand involved.  However, the data I describe in the next 
chapter of this thesis suggest that this may not always be the case and it is questionable whether 
recall information is being broadly disseminated among consumers.  In fact, my data show that 
only about 25 percent of meat and poultry recall cases from 1982 to 2008 were covered by the 
AP Newswire.  This percentage varies substantially from year to year.  Why are some of the 
recalls covered by the media whereas the majority is not?  What are the peculiarities of a recall 
event that make them newsworthy?  I will explore these questions further and address the 
possible reasons. 
Jolly and Mowen (1985) assess consumer perceptions of recalling companies by examining 
three different communication factors within an experimental study.  They investigate 
consumer response to source of information, type of media used, and the presence of social 
responsibility information.  Their experimental scenario involved a defective hair dryer from 
the company Conair Corporation and was based on a real recall event.  The experiment sample 
was drawn from undergraduate students enrolled in the Business College at a Midwestern 
university and from students in an introductory management and consumer behavior class.  
They find that, when the information emphasized the social responsibility aspects of the recall, 
either in recall information provided by the government or by the company itself, there was a 
positive reaction by consumers towards the recalling company.  This somewhat corresponds to 
Mowen, Jolly, and Nickel’s (1981) assertion that social responsibility is important to consumer 
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preferences.  This finding is important because it informs strategies that companies can use to 
improve their image after a crisis or to diminish consumers’ negative response to adverse 
information that accompanies the crisis (Jolly and Mowen 1985).  Based on Miller and 
Littlefield’s (2010) description of the ConAgra peanut butter recall, it appears that the company 
pursued a social responsibility emphasis in their crisis communications and behavior towards 
the recall.  Souiden and Pons (2009) show a similar result automobile recalls.  They find that in 
cases where a firm disapproved of the recall, the there was a negative impact on its image, 
consumer loyalty, and consumer purchase intentions.  However, when the recall was voluntary, 
there was a positive impact on each of these constructs.  In addition, they assert that companies 
should opt for a proactive strategy during a recall crisis in order to diminish image damage. 
Jolly and Mowen (1985) also find that information presented by the government was 
considered by consumers as a more reliable and objective than information presented by the 
company.  Finally, the results show that the print media were evaluated by the consumers as 
more dependable and objective than radio media sources.  
Hooker, Teratanavat, and Salin (2005) assess meat and poultry recalls from 1994 to 2002.  
They collected recall data from FSIS, and investigate the effectiveness of crisis management by 
examining the proportion of pounds recovered to the total pounds recalled (called recovery rate 
by the researchers), the duration in days of a recall case (completion time), and the ratio 
between recovery rate and completion time.  They evaluate these measures using managerial 
and technical variables.  The authors find that very small plants perform recalls more 
effectively than small plants
2
, which goes against their hypothesis.  Results also imply that 
                                                             
2
 According to the authors, large plants are the ones with more than 500 employees, small 
plants have between 10 and 500 employees, and very small plants consist of plants that employ 
less than 10 employees or have less than $2.5 million in annual sales. 
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small plants may be more effective than large plants in recovering recalled products in a timely 
fashion.  In addition, they found that recalls of processed products were more effective (had 
higher recovery rates and ratios between recovery rate and completion time).  Recall duration 
was longer for plants that belonged to a larger firm and for recalls of larger volume.  Finally, 
the authors report that nature of the foodborne hazard or severity of health risk had no influence 
on recall effectiveness measures. 
 
Recalls and Consumer Confidence 
A major nationwide food recall increases consumer concerns about food safety in general. 
Stinson et al. (2008) measured consumer perceptions and attitudes towards food safety and 
food defense, which bears primary responsibility for these issues, and how funds should be 
allocated to ensure a safe and secure food supply.  The researchers conducted three surveys, 
one in 2005 and two in 2007.  One of the 2007 surveys was performed after a nationwide recall 
of spinach and lettuce.  The other was performed after a large pet food recall.  Their 
conclusions are that consumer confidence in food safety and food defense decreases after a 
major national recall event.  They also found that concerns over food defense rose over the 
study period, along with perceptions of funding that should be allocated to preventing 
intentional food contamination.  In addition, they assert that the public believes the government 
is principally responsible for food safety and food defense. 
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CHAPTER 3: DATA 
 
Two sources of data were used in this thesis.  First, I used records on meat and poultry 
recalls from the USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) and developed a database 
from these records for the years 1982 through 2009.  FSIS records contain an identification 
number for each recall and provide descriptive facts about meat and poultry recalls including 
the product being recalled, the name and location of the company producing the product, the 
reason for the recall, and the volume of product subject to recall.  Secondly, I conducted a 
content analysis of Associated Press (AP) Newswire stories covering meat and poultry recalls 
for this same 1982 to 2009 period. 
My rationale for choosing the AP Newswire as an indicator of coverage is that the AP is 
known by its broad distribution, credibility and accessibility.  According to Forbes, the AP 
reports for more than 40 percent of the content of daily’s newspapers (Hau 2008).  The AP is a 
newsgathering cooperative organization. Information from smaller and less prominent 
newspapers around the country is likely to be reported and published by the AP.  For this 
reason, the AP has an advantage as an indicator of coverage over one or more of the nation’s 
leading newspapers such as USA Today, The New York Times, and The Wall Street Journal.  In 
addition, AP serves newspapers and other media sources, which often use its news.  The AP 
website asserts that "on any given day, more than half the world's population sees news from 
the AP (The Associated Press 2011)."  In short, the AP was chosen because it provided the 
highest likelihood of identifying coverage of recall events.  In addition, the adoption of a single, 
comprehensive, news source helped to simplify and optimize the process of story search and 
avoid duplicate articles when the same story appeared in multiple print outlets. 
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Searches of the AP newswire were performed using the Lexis Nexis Academic database, 
which is available through the University of Arkansas libraries.  Identifying search terms 
involved a balancing act between finding a term that identified most meat or poultry recalls but 
did not return a large number of unrelated (false positive) stories.  After several tries, the search 
strategy used was for the term “recall” within 15 or fewer words of the appearance of the terms 
“meat” or “beef” or “chicken” or “pork.”  The search was performed while restricting Lexis 
Nexis to look only within content from the AP.  The search provided 1,450 stories from 1982 to 
2009. 
Each story was read and analyzed for content.  Specifically, it was noted whether the story 
was primarily about product recalls and whether a specific meat or poultry recall event could be 
tied to the story.  Stories never provided the FSIS recall identification number but they 
generally did provide enough information about the company recalling the product, the product 
being recalled, and the size of the recall to enable an easy match between stories and specific 
recall cases in the FSIS recall data.  Figure 3.1 provides a flowchart illustrating the approach to 
coding stories.  Outcomes of the coding exercise are summarized in figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.1. Flowchart for coding AP Newswire stories. 
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Figure 3.2. Coding outcomes (number of stories). 
 
Irrelevant Stories 
Despite the fairly narrow search terms used, there were a number of articles that met the 
search criteria but had no relevance to product recalls.  For example, phrases such as “John Doe 
recalled his childhood spent raising chickens on his family’s farm” or “Pork barrel spending is 
worse today than anyone can recall” would each meet the search criteria outlined above but has 
nothing to do with product recalls.  As shown in figure 3.2, 186 stories were coded as not being 
about product recalls.  This amounts to 13 percent of all search results. 
 
186, 13% 
160, 11% 
77, 5% 
852, 59% 
175, 12% 
Irrelevant: Story not about recalls
Primary story not linked to an FSIS recall ID number
Secondary story not linked to an FSIS recall ID number
Primary story linked to one or more FSIS recall ID numbers
Secondary story linked to one or more FSIS ID numbers
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Primary Stories 
An article was classified as primary when the major subject was product recalls, regardless 
of whether the product recall actually involved meat or poultry.  While the search terms used in 
Lexis Nexis were specific to meat and poultry products, there were still some hits for articles 
covering recalls of toys, cars, drugs, and foods other than meat or poultry.  These were still 
classified as primary articles within my coding framework, so long as the primary focus of the 
story was on product recalls. 
Primary stories were matched, when possible, with one or more recall events in the USDA-
FSIS recall database.  As shown in figure 3.2, 59 percent of all search results were classified as 
primary stories and were matched to at least one recall event.  It is important to emphasize that 
it is possible for more than one recall ID number to appear in a given story.  Table 3.1 shows 
that in most cases, stories mentioned only one recall event. However, it was not a rare 
occurrence for a story to mention multiple events.  Of the 852 primary stories linked to recall 
events (figure 3.2), table 3.1 (middle row) shows that 142 were linked to multiple events.  In 
fact, one story mentioned 9 recall events in the FSIS records. 
 
Table 3.1. Frequency (number of stories) linked to FSIS recall events by coding outcome 
 Recall events linked to the Story Total 
Stories Coding Outcome 0 1 2 3 4 9 
Story was not about recalls 186 - - - - - 186 
Primary story 160 709 101 35 6 1 1,012 
Secondary story 77 161 12 2 - - 252 
Total Stories 423 870 113 37 6 1 1,450 
 
Recall events, when linked to a story, were also coded as having received either primary or 
secondary coverage.  Hence, it is possible within my coding scheme for a story to be coded as 
primary but for one or more recall cases mentioned within the story to be coded as having 
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received secondary coverage.  My guiding principle in coding was that stories were coded as 
primary whenever the main focus of the story was about product recalls.  Similarly, specific 
recall events linked to a story were coded as primary whenever the primary focus of the recall 
was on the specific recall case in question. 
To illustrate, each of the following examples provides a situation where recall cases were 
linked to a primary story but the recall case itself was coded as having received secondary 
coverage. 
 On April 23, 1983 the major subject of an AP article was on the recall of salami 
products announced by FSIS the week before.  However, the article mentioned an 
earlier recall event involving the same company.  The primary focus of the article was 
on the latest recall event and so this latest event was coded as having received primary 
coverage.  The earlier recall, which was mentioned tangentially, was coded as having 
received secondary coverage. 
 On May 15, 2000 an article appeared on the Newswire that addressed the increase in 
recalls due to Listeria in meat products, which was an outcome of expanded 
government testing for this pathogen.  Three specific recall events were mentioned in 
the story.  However, because the primary focus of the story was on the trend in Listeria 
recalls and not these three events, each of these events was coded as having received 
secondary coverage. 
 On January 15, 2000 an article described a new USDA policy of publicizing every meat 
and poultry recall, including the ones that involved minimal health risk.  Again, this 
story was about recalls but not about any specific recall case.  The article did mention 
two recalls, one in 1997 and one in 1999 that were the largest and smallest recalls which 
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had received press releases prior to the policy change.  Both of these recall events were 
coded as having received secondary coverage. 
Primary articles to which I could find no corresponding recall in the FSIS records were 
generally ones about non food products or food products other than meat and poultry that are 
not under the USDA jurisdiction, and therefore have no corresponding information in the FSIS 
database.  In other cases, the primary focus of the article was meat or poultry recalls but the 
content of the article related to recall policies and practices, and did not refer to specific recall 
events.  For sake of illustration, some examples of articles coded as primary but not matched to 
a recall ID are as follows: 
 An article on July 3, 1999 addressed the question of the government’s authority to order 
mandatory recalls and the arguments in the debate over whether mandatory recall 
authority should be extended to federal government agencies. 
 On March 7, 2006 a story reported on a USDA proposal change the agency’s disclosure 
policy by including the names of the retail outlets in recall announcements. 
 On May 6, 2005 an article discussed the recall of frozen vegetarian food due to the 
potential presence of an undeclared allergen. 
 On November 29, 2007 recalls of different brands of cars was reported by a story on the 
AP Newswire.  
In each of these cases product recalls were the primary subject of the story and so each was 
coded as a primary story.  The first two stories were about meat and poultry recalls but did not 
mention any specific recall case.  The latter two stories mentioned specific recall cases but none 
that were under FSIS jurisdiction.  Each of these stories was ultimately coded as a primary 
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story not linked to an FSIS recall ID number.  As shown in figure 3.2, there were 160 of these 
stories accounting for 11 percent of all search results. 
 
Secondary Stories 
Articles were classified as secondary when the main subject was something other than 
product recalls but when product recalls or specific recall events were mentioned within the 
story.  As in the primary articles, a recall ID was associated to the article whenever possible. 
When the article received the secondary notation, every recall ID that could be connected to it 
was coded as having received secondary coverage as well, with no exceptions.  Some articles 
are exemplified as follows. 
 On July 4, 2000 a story -- designed to whet the appetite for 4th of July hamburgers -- 
focused on problems the beef industry faced with controlling the deadly E. coli 
pathogen along with the steps that one processor was taking to address these problems.  
The article mentioned beef recalls but no specific recall event.   
 On April 26, 2000 the Newswire reported on quarterly financial reports of Sara Lee 
Corporation.  A major recall the company faced in 1998 was cited as one of the reasons 
for its food unit’s decline.  
 On September 2, 2007 an article addressed the then recent and increasing practice of 
outsourcing production and sale of products from one plant under many different 
brands.  It also discussed the consequences of this practice for food safety and 
traceability.  Several prominent and large recalls of both meat and non-meat food 
products were cited in the article. 
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In the first example, the story was primarily about food safety (E. coli specifically) and not 
about product recalls.  For this reason, the story was given a secondary designation.  Similarly 
the second and third stories were primarily about financial performance and business practices, 
respectively, with recalls being mentioned tangentially.  In these latter two cases, specific recall 
events could be identified within the FSIS records and, as explained above, these events were 
also coded as having received secondary coverage. 
 
Other Coding Issues 
In most cases, coverage of recall events mentioned the company somewhere in the story 
and this was used to link the story to a specific event in the FSIS records.  However, in some 
cases the recall event was indicated implicitly.  That is, when the company’s name is absent.  A 
recall described in a story can be tied to the FSIS records by any combination of information 
given, such as the date of the recall event, the product being recalled, the recall reason, the 
pounds recalled, the city and state where the plant and/or company is located, and the parent 
company’s name.  An example is provided by an article appearing on February 10, 1998 about 
an experimental vaccine created to protect people against E. coli infection.  Since the focus was 
primarily on the vaccine, the article was classified as secondary coverage.  It did mention the 
recall in 1997 of millions of pounds of ground beef for E.coli contamination but did not 
specifically mention a company name.  In 1997 Hudson Foods recalled 25 million pounds of 
ground beef after an E. coli outbreak was linked to this company and so it was clear that the 
recall event described in the story was a reference to the Hudson Foods case.  For these 
reasons, the article was coded as secondary coverage for the Hudson Foods recall event.  In 
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these types of situations, I did make a coding note indicating that the linkage between the story 
and the FSIS recall records was implicit. 
Another issue that warrants mention is my handling of news summaries that appear on the 
Newswire.  These summaries are similar to the highlights that often appear on the front page of 
daily newspapers.  They consist of several synopses of leading stories in areas such as business 
news, domestic news, international news, sports, and so forth.  Some of the recall events were 
mentioned within these news summaries.  When coding these summaries, I looked at the main 
subject of the synopsis that mentioned product recall and made the coding decisions based on 
that synopsis alone, without regard to the multiple other synopses on various other topics.  I 
indicated these news summaries in my coding notes. 
 
Key Features of the Datasets 
FSIS Recalls over Time 
Table 3.2 shows the number and volume of FSIS recalls over the study period classified by 
severity.  The recall events receive severity classifications by the FSIS based on the potential 
hazard the product can cause to the consumer’s health (as mentioned before in chapter 1, p. 3).  
Table 3.2 is similar to that presented by Thomsen and McKenzie (2001), who report data from 
FSIS from 1982 to 1998.   
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Table 3.2. Number of recalls by class and pounds recalled.
1 
  Class I   Class II   Class III 
Year Number  Pounds    Number  Pounds    Number  Pounds  
                  
1982 12 719,833 
 
6 280,339 
   1983 6 170,072 
 
1 428,000 
 
2 266,220 
1984 5 436,512 
 
1 93,600 
 
4 2,004 
1985 6 163,088 
 
10 1,706,453 
 
2 132,293 
1986 5 711,706 
 
8 1,670,111 
 
2 465,591 
1987 8 1,090,520 
 
30 8,631,531 
 
5 1,541,345 
1988 4 237,326 
 
13 5,205,813 
 
4 292,604 
1989 13 348,008 
 
12 3,212,155 
 
1 2,903 
1990 18 2,138,838 
 
8 606,367 
 
2 79,521 
1991 16 2,079,333 
 
17 4,664,738 
 
4 558,755 
1992 18 2,561,856 
 
15 623,693 
 
3 3,047,950 
1993 24 582,726 
 
11 2,106,611 
 
3 2,705,870 
1994 28 1,401,908 
 
18 3,257,845 
 
2 115,300 
1995 28 5,048,105 
 
10 575,503 
   1996 17 360,752 
 
6 590,845 
 
2 52,430 
1997 16 27,005,998 
 
11 1,143,991 
   1998 30 43,136,101 
 
12 2,884,755 
 
2 18,623 
1999 54 39,033,811 
 
7 879,037 
 
1 12,516 
2000 75 21,206,054 
 
7 1,544,500 
 
3 12,920 
2001 71 21,059,415 
 
12 8,852,900 
 
14 1,650,920 
2002 93 56,379,833 
 
15 1,082,400 
 
17 379,230 
2003 44 2,443,549 
 
13 216,220 
 
11 653,205 
2004 41 2,462,711 
 
4 153,050 
 
4 274,410 
2005 48 5,940,165 
 
3 429,400 
 
1 74,810 
2006 26 4,703,669 
 
6 1,136,964 
 
2 25,300 
2007 50 48,458,459 
 
7 158,353 
 
1 19,488 
2008 42 9,816,427 
 
12 144,910,236 
   2009 44 5,518,290 
 
21 782,565 
 
4 3,089,258 
Total 842 305,215,065   296 197,827,975   96 15,473,466 
1
 There are 1,240 total recall IDs in the dataset. Six of them are missing the class 
categorization and so are not reported in table 3.2.
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Coverage of FSIS Recalls 
The total number of recall events reported in table 3.2 over the 1982 to 2009 period is 
1,234
3
.  Among them, 311 recall events, or around 25 percent, were covered at least once by 
the AP newswire.  Trends in recalls and the proportion of recalls receiving coverage in the 
Newswire are presented in figure 3.3.  By year, the percent covered by at least one Newswire 
story ranges from a low of around 8 percent in 1994 and 1996 to a high of 40 percent in 1984 
and 2000.  The overall pattern in FSIS recall events over time follows, to a certain extent, the 
pattern documented by Chun, Lin, and Prather (2005) for non-automotive product recalls 
appearing in the Wall Street Journal Index.  Similar to my data, these authors find that product 
recalls for non-automotive consumer products were less frequent before the early 1990s, and 
they document a gradual increase in recalls through the late 1990s, reaching its peak in the year 
2000.  The peak among meat and poultry recalls appears slightly later, hitting the highest point 
in 2002.  This increase in number of recalls issued by the FSIS is also due to policy and 
regulatory changes that were applied, especially in the late 80’s and the 90’s, such as an 
increase in sampling by the FSIS at the plant level and lower tolerance for presence of 
pathogens by the agency (Ollinger and Ballenger 2003; U.S. Department of Agriculture 2001; 
Brasher 2000a; Brasher 2000b).  These changes also are noticed in the reasons for recalls, with 
a sharp rise in those due to presence of E. coli and Listeria. 
                                                             
3
 There are 1,240 total recall IDs in the dataset. Six of them are missing the class categorization 
and so are not reported in Table 3.2. 
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Figure 3.3. Total number of recall events and number with coverage by the AP Newswire from 1982 to 2009. 
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Reasons for Meat and Poultry Recalls 
Information on the reason for the product recall is always mentioned in FSIS records and 
announcements.  I assigned reasons for recalls to one of five categories.  The total number of 
recalls assigned to each category is reported in table 3.3. 
 E. coli 0157:H7: the reason cited was for contamination with this bacterial pathogen.  
 Listeria monocytogenes: the reason cited was for contamination for this bacterial 
pathogen.  In a handful of cases the reason given was for contamination for Salmonella 
along with Listeria.  In these cases, I assigned Listeria as the primary reason. 
 Mislabeled: includes recalls for which the reason given is mislabeling or formulation 
errors. 
 Other: includes recalls for which the reason involves a variety of other violations 
including chemical contaminants; physical contaminants such as metal, bone fragments 
or glass; and other regulatory violations such as meat shipped without inspection or 
imported from an unapproved source. 
 Other Microorganisms: includes recalls for other microbiological contaminants 
including Salmonella when listed alone without Listeria, a variety of other bacterial 
pathogens, and molds. 
 
Table 3.3. Number of recalls by reason. 
Reason Recall IDs Percent Cumulative Percent 
E. coli O157:H7 219 17.66 17.66 
Listeria 319 25.73 43.39 
Mislabeled 239 19.27 62.66 
Other 368 29.68 92.34 
Other Microorganism 95 7.66 100.00 
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Entity Discovering the Problem 
Most of the recall announcements, especially the most recent ones, identify how the 
problem was discovered.  I assigned problem discovery to three broad entities based on FSIS 
records or press releases.  These are reported in table 3.4.  I assigned discovery to the company 
whenever FSIS records indicate that the problem was identified by the company itself, by the 
company’s final consumers, or by another business entity either upstream or downstream 
within the company’s supply chain.  I assigned discovery to FSIS whenever records indicate 
that FSIS identified the problem leading the product recall.  Finally, I assigned discovery to 
other governmental entities whenever recall records indicate that the problem was identified by 
a local, state or federal body other than FSIS.  These include state departments of health, the 
CDC, the US Food and Drug Administration, other agencies within USDA, US Customs, 
foreign governments, and several others.  Often, but not always, these recalls appear to have 
been initiated after epidemiological evidence has linked an outbreak to specific product. 
FSIS has changed their database structure over the years.  Before 1998, many of the FSIS 
recall announcements were not accompanied by an automatic press release.  The press release 
is a separate file that usually explains how the problem was discovered.  In many cases before 
1998, recall records indicate that there was a press release but the actual text of the press 
release is no longer available.  Therefore, data from the earlier part of the sample has missing 
values for the entity discovering the problem.  The total number of recall events with missing 
this information is 432. 
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Table 3.4. Number of recalls by discovering entity.
1
 
Discovered Recall IDs
1 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Company 276 34.16 34.16 
FSIS 436 53.96 88.12 
Other Government Entity 96 11.88 100.00 
1
In 432 recall cases, FSIS records did not provide adequate information in  
order to assign problem discovery to one of these three entities. 
 
Day of the Week 
Table 3.5 shows proportion of recalls by discovering entity and day of the week.  FSIS 
recalls occur most frequently on Tuesdays.  Recalls discovered by other governmental entities 
are much less frequent on Monday and most frequent on Thursday.  Interestingly, company 
discovered recalls are most likely to occur on Fridays.  This may represent strategic behavior 
on part of companies to try to lessen the negative publicity generated by the recall 
announcement as news consumption patterns differ on weekends.  I further explore whether 
Friday recalls are less likely to be covered in Newswire stories in my empirical models 
described below. 
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Table 3.5. Percent of recalls by discovering entity and day of the week.
1 
Discovered Weekend Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
FSIS 10.78 15.83 22.25 18.12 14.68 18.35 
Other Government Entity 16.67 4.17 19.79 15.63 22.92 20.83 
Company 6.16 11.23 16.67 17.39 21.38 27.17 
1
 In 432 recall cases, FSIS records did not provide adequate information to assign problem discovery 
to one of these three entities. 
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Large Recalls and Coverage 
Table 3.6 summarizes the ten largest recall events during the period of study.  With the 
exception of the Hallmark/Westland recall, each of these recalls was given the most serious 
class I severity designation.  Table 3.7 shows the eleven recall events with the most coverage 
(either primary or secondary) in the AP Newswire.  A comparison of table 3.6 with 3.7 
indicates that size of the recall, in terms of total volume matters.  In fact, eight of the companies 
with the largest recalls listed in table 3.6 also appear among those receiving the greatest number 
of Newswire stories in table 3.7. 
 
Table 3.6. Ten largest recalls during the study period. 
Company Year Class Cause Initiated Pounds 
Hallmark/Westland Meat Packing  2008 II Other FSIS 143,383,823  
Bil Mar Foods 1998 I Listeria Other Gov. Entity 35,000,000  
Thorn Apple Valley 1999 I Listeria FSIS 35,000,000  
Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation 2002 I Listeria FSIS 27,400,000  
Hudson Foods 1997 I E. coli  Other Gov. Entity 25,000,000  
Topps Meat Company, LLC 2007 I E. coli  Other Gov. Entity 21,700,000  
ConAgra Beef Company 2002 I E. coli  FSIS 19,000,000  
Cargill Turkey Products 2000 I Listeria Company 16,895,000  
Bar-S Foods Co 2001 I Listeria FSIS 14,500,000  
Castleberry's Food Company 2007 I Other Micro Other Gov. Entity 11,172,478  
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Table 3.7. Ten most covered recalls by the AP Newswire. 
Company Year Class Cause Initiated Total Coverage
1, 2 
Hudson Foods 1997 I E. coli Other Gov. Entity 208 
Hallmark/Westland Meat Packing 2008 II Other  FSIS 98 
Bil Mar Foods 1998 I Listeria Other Gov. Entity 78 
ConAgra Beef Company 2002 I E. coli FSIS 61 
Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation 2002 I Listeria FSIS 43 
Topps Meat Company, LLC 2007 I E. coli Other Gov. Entity 38 
Verns Moses Lake Meats 2003 II Other Other Gov. Entity 37 
Beef America Operation Co. Inc. 1997 I E. coli 
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Thorn Apple Valley 1999 I Listeria FSIS 17 
ConAgra Foods 2007 I Other Micro Other Gov. Entity 17 
Castleberry's Food Company 2007 I Other Micro Other Gov. Entity 17 
1
Total coverage ranges from pre-recall announcement to after twenty six weeks of recall announcement. 
2
Number of articles that were assigned to the recall ID number in any classification (primary or secondary). 
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CHAPTER 4: METHODS 
 
Regression Analysis for Count Data 
Count data models were used to model coverage of recall events.  In these models the unit 
of analysis is the recall case.  The dependent variable is coverage and was measured two ways.  
The first way was the number of primary coverage articles linked to the recall case during the 
first week of the recall.  The second way was the total number of primary coverage articles 
linked to the recall case from the time of the recall through the end of the study period (through 
the end of 2009).  Tables 4.1 and table 4.2 show the frequency of article counts for each of the 
dependent variables.  As evident in both tables, the number of zero counts is large for each 
measure of coverage.  Zero counts can come from two possible sources.  First, it is possible that 
some recall cases never receives coverage in the AP Newswire due to the combination of one 
or more of their characteristics.  In fact, I expect that recalls involving small volumes of 
product will likely not be considered for a story by the AP.  The results of the zero (probit) 
model in chapter 5 will point to these specific characteristics.  In other words, the probit model 
will distinguish between the recall events that will never receive an AP story and those that 
might.  When the recall presents characteristics that make it likely to have at least one AP story, 
then the count models (negative binomial and the Poisson) will apply.  However, it is possible 
that some of these recalls will still receive no coverage by the AP.  This is the second possible 
source of zeros in my data. 
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Table 4.1. Primarily coverage within the first week of the recall announcement. 
Coverage  
(Number of Articles)
 
Frequency 
(Recall Cases) 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
0 553 70.90 70.90 
1 151 19.36 90.26 
2 50 6.41 96.67 
3 13 1.67 98.33 
4 5 0.64 98.97 
5 1 0.13 99.10 
6 2 0.26 99.36 
7 2 0.26 99.62 
12 2 0.26 99.87 
14 1 0.13 100.00 
 
 
Table 4.2. Total primary coverage. 
Coverage  
(Number of Articles)
1 
Frequency 
(Recall Cases) 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
0 546 70.00 70.00 
1 142 18.21 88.21 
2 55 7.05 95.26 
3 14 1.79 97.05 
4 4 0.51 97.56 
5 8 1.03 98.59 
6 1 0.13 98.72 
7 3 0.38 99.10 
10 1 0.13 99.23 
15 1 0.13 99.36 
25 1 0.13 99.49 
26 1 0.13 99.62 
31 1 0.13 99.74 
42 1 0.13 99.87 
97 1 0.13 100.00 
1
Number of articles primarily covering one or more recall IDs for the entire period is a 
count variable. 
 
The summary literature on count data models (see Long 1997 and Cameron and Trivedi 
1998 as examples) recommends that when excessive zeros arise from two possible sources, the 
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zero-inflated count model should be used.  Bilgic, Florkowski, and Akbay (2010) also assert 
that the zero inflated models permit the relaxation of the Poisson model’s restriction that the 
conditional mean must be equal to the conditional variance, and thus are considered alternative 
models for count data.  For this reason, I implemented the Zero-Inflated Poisson (ZIP) and 
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) in this study.  In each model, I use a probit model to 
estimate the probability of zero counts. 
Explanatory variables include total volume subject to recall (measured as the logarithm of 
pounds to avoid scale effects), binary variables measuring the reason for the recall, binary 
variables indicating who discovered the problem leading to the recall, and binary variables 
indicating the day of the week on which the recall was announced.  Table 4.3 provides 
descriptive statistics for the final samples used in the count data models.  As noted earlier, the 
entity discovering the recall was not reported in FSIS records during the early part of the data, 
typically before 1998.  Consequently, I am reporting descriptive statistics for the total sample 
and for the subsample that contains non-missing observations on recall discovery. 
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Table 4.3.  Descriptive statistics for samples used in the zero-inflated count data models. 
    Total sample (n=1,192)   
Sample with values for discovered  
(n = 780) 
  
Unit of 
Measurement 
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.   Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent Variables 
          Prim. Coverage Week of Recall Number of Stories 0.389 1.052 0 14 
 
0.486 1.157 0 14 
Prim. Coverage Total Number of Stories 0.628 3.514 0 97 
 
0.799 4.269 0 97 
           Explanatory Variables 
          Volume recalled Pounds 314,722 2,146,556 1 35,000,000 
 
399,109 2,627,134 1 35,000,000 
Log (volume recalled) Log of pounds 9.022 2.828 0 17.371 
 
8.795 2.981 0 17.371 
Reason E. coli 0157:H7 Binary 0.179 0.383 0 1 
 
0.253 0.435 0 1 
Reason L. monocytogenes Binary 0.266 0.442 0 1 
 
0.303 0.46 0 1 
Reason Other Binary 0.294 0.456 0 1 
 
0.187 0.39 0 1 
Reason Other Microbiological Binary 0.076 0.266 0 1 
 
0.045 0.207 0 1 
Reason Mislabeled
1
 Binary 0.185 0.388 0 1 
 
0.213 0.41 0 1 
Discovered FSIS Binary 
     
0.538 0.499 0 1 
Discovered Other Govt. Entity Binary 
     
0.113 0.317 0 1 
Discovered Company
1
 Binary 
     
0.349 0.477 0 1 
Monday Recall Binary 0.138 0.345 0 1 
 
0.127 0.333 0 1 
Tuesday Recall Binary 0.196 0.397 0 1 
 
0.204 0.403 0 1 
Wednesday Recall Binary 0.172 0.378 0 1 
 
0.172 0.377 0 1 
Thursday Recall Binary 0.191 0.393 0 1 
 
0.182 0.386 0 1 
Friday Recall
1
 Binary 0.235 0.424 0 1 
 
0.217 0.412 0 1 
Saturday Recall Binary 0.068 0.252 0 1   0.099 0.298 0 1 
1
 Omitted category in all model specifications. 
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Before estimating the model, two recalls were excluded from the dataset because they were 
atypical.  Both received an abnormally high number of article counts.  One recall was due to 
possible Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) contamination by Verns Moses Lake 
Meats in 2003.  The other recall was in 2008 by Hallmark/Westland Meat Packing and was due 
to the slaughter and processing of a non-ambulatory or “downer” cow, which increases the risk 
of contamination with BSE.  I also excluded 46 recall cases because they were missing 
information for volume (total pounds) subject to recall.  After removing these observations, I 
was left with 1,192 observations in the full sample and 780 observations in the subsample with 
non-missing observations on recall discovery. 
 
Empirical Implementation 
I used the COUNTREG procedure in SAS
®
 version 9.2 to estimate three specifications of 
both the ZIP and ZINB models (see table 4.4).  Explanatory variables listed in table 4.4 were 
included in both the count and excess zero equations.  To provide evidence on robustness, 
specification 1 was estimated using both the full sample of 1,192 observations and the 
subsample of 780 observations.  I did face convergence issues mostly in estimating the excess 
zero equations within the ZINB model and convergence depended on choice of optimization 
algorithm within the SAS software.  My rationale for the use of the normal distribution (probit) 
link for the zero model was that it lessened convergence problems.  The estimation method for 
the covariance matrix was quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) (SAS 2011) since this also 
helped to facilitate convergence. 
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Table 4.4. Dependent and independent variables of the count data model. 
Dependent Variable Explanatory Variables 
  Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 
Measure 1: Primary 
coverage for the recall 
event during the first 
week of the recall 
(number of articles) 
 
Measure 2: Total primary 
coverage for the recall 
event (number of articles) 
Logarithm of 
pounds subject to 
recall 
 
Binary variables 
indicating reason 
for recall 
 
Logarithm of 
pounds subject to 
recall 
 
Binary variables 
indicating reason 
for recall 
 
Binary variables 
indicating how the 
recall was 
discovered 
 
Logarithm of 
pounds subject to 
recall 
 
Binary variables 
indicating reason 
for recall 
 
Binary variables 
indicating how 
the recall was 
discovered 
 
Binary variables 
indicating day of 
the week 
 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesized relationships based on the literature review and earlier descriptive analyses of 
the data presented in earlier chapters are as follows.  First, I expect a positive relationship 
between the size of the recall (logarithm of pounds recalled) and article counts.  In the zero 
(probit) equation, the dependent variable is considered a “certain zero”, which means the model 
include the recall IDs that did not get primary covered by the AP and thus have a zero count of 
stories.  In other words, the zero model is estimating the probability of an outcome of zero.  For 
this reason, I expect a negative relationship between the volume of recalled product and the 
probability of having a zero count of articles published on the specific recall event.  Second, I 
hypothesize that meat and poultry products recalled due to presence of E. coli, Listeria, or other 
microbiological problems will have a larger number of article counts.  Analogously, I expect a 
negative coefficient on binary variables for these reasons in the zero equation.  Third, I 
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anticipate that variables indicating problem discovery by FSIS or another governmental entity 
will have a positive coefficients in the count data equation and negative coefficients in the zero 
equation.  Finally, to the extent that weekend news cycles differ from weekdays, it is 
reasonable to expect Friday announcements to receive fewer article counts as they can be 
expected to receive less initial exposure. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
 
Primary Coverage During the Week of the Recall 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the results of the zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) and zero-
inflated Poisson (ZIP) models, respectively, for article counts of primary coverage during the 
first week after the recall announcement.  Results for specifications 1 and 2, with and without 
binary controls for entity discovering the problem, are presented in these tables. 
Table 5.1 shows that estimates are robust to sample size and specification.  This is 
especially true for estimates in the count equation which addresses factors affecting the number 
of primary articles published.  In each count equation, the signs and statistical significance of 
the coefficients are quite similar.  The coefficient of the estimate for recall volume (logarithm 
of pounds recalled) is remarkably similar across the different regressions.  The magnitudes of 
estimates for binary variables indicating the reason for a recall are also similar between 
specification 1 and specification 2 in the subsample of 780 observations.  However, comparing 
specification 1 across the two different samples indicates that estimates for these binary 
variables are smaller in the subsample than in the full sample (n=1,192). 
The regression coefficients in the count equation can be used to determine the impact, in 
terms of the number of articles, of a change in the explanatory variable.  Specifically, given a 
one unit increase in an explanatory variable, this impact is given by a function of the estimate 
provided all the other variables in the model are kept constant (UCLA: Academic Technology 
Services, Statistical Consulting Group 2011).  For all the specifications in table 5.1, these 
coefficients suggest that an increase in the volume of product recalled will increase the number 
of articles published in the AP.  For the binary variables the positive estimates for reasons E. 
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coli contamination, Listeria contamination, other microbiological contamination, or other 
problems indicate that recalls for these reasons are expected to have a higher number of 
primary articles than recalls that are the result of mislabeling, the omitted category.  E. coli and 
Listeria contamination represent serious health risks to consumers and may be linked to an 
outbreak so it is expected that recalls for these reasons would receive more coverage.  
Specification 2 also includes binary indicator variables for the entity discovering the 
problem leading to a recall.  These results suggest that recalls initiated by FSIS have more 
articles than those that were initiated by the company (omitted category).  Recalls initiated by 
other government entities would also be expected to receive more coverage since many of these 
recalls are related to outbreaks of foodborne illness.  The estimated coefficient, however, is not 
statistically significant. 
 
 
  
4
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Table 5.1. Zero-inflated negative binomial models for primary article counts in the first week of the recall. 
  Full  Sample n=1192  Sample with non-missing discovery measures n=780 
  Specification 1  Specification 1 Specification 2 
Parameter Estimate t ratio  Estimate t ratio Estimate t ratio 
Count Equation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept -4.202*** -5.230  -3.856*** -8.770 -4.038*** -11.190 
Logarithm of pounds 0.254*** 3.660  0.251*** 7.160 0.258*** 9.100 
Reason – E.coli 1.465*** 5.660  1.103*** 6.210 0.908*** 4.830 
Reason – Listeria 1.380*** 6.460  1.074*** 5.400 0.874*** 4.630 
Reason – Other 1.166*** 3.680  0.368* 1.730 0.571*** 2.610 
Reason – Other Micro 1.946*** 7.350  1.794*** 4.900 1.113** 2.370 
Discovered – FSIS        0.420*** 2.730 
Discovered – Other Gov.        0.233 1.480 
Zero Equation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept -1.075 -0.300  1.718* 1.660 -1.895 -1.050 
Logarithm of pounds -0.158 -1.540  -0.326*** -4.440 -0.361*** -4.550 
Reason – E.coli 1.923 0.860  0.589 1.000 -0.321 -0.530 
Reason – Listeria 1.996 0.810  0.293 0.460 -0.768 -1.240 
Reason – Other 3.021 1.110  -0.289 -0.270 1.643** 2.320 
Reason – Other Micro 3.416 1.350  2.011*** 2.670 0.960 0.890 
Discovered – FSIS         5.012*** 3.480 
Discovered – Other Gov.        -0.652 -0.400 
Alpha 0.264*** 2.630  0.172* 1.940 0.208*** 2.700 
AIC   1634    1190   1183 
SBC   1700    1251   1262 
Log likelihood -803.815    -582.068   -574.356 
Optimization method   Newton-Raphson    Double Dogleg   Double Dogleg 
* significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at 1% level. 
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Coefficient estimate magnitudes in the zero equation of the ZINB model vary depending on 
sample size and specification.  Most of these coefficients are not statistically significant.  In 
fact, in the full sample none of the coefficients in the zero equation are significant.  Cameron 
and Trivedi (1998) note that when most of the variables in the zero section of the model are 
insignificant, it implies that the independent variables have the majority of their explanatory 
power through their influence on the “positive counts.”  The interpretation for the predictors 
whose estimates are not significant is that the odds of being a “certain zero” do not change 
when a continuous variable changes (logarithm of pounds) or does not change relative to the 
omitted category for the binary variables (UCLA: Academic Technology Services, Statistical 
Consulting Group 2011).  For the subsample, both specifications 1 and 2 present negative and 
significant estimates for the logarithm of pounds recalled.  Because the zero model is based on 
a probit model, this means that for a unit increase in the logarithm of pounds, the odds of a 
recall event having zero coverage by the AP decreases.  This means that as the volume of 
product involved in a recall case increases it is less likely to observe a zero count and is 
consistent with findings above that large recalls receive more coverage.  In the zero equation 
for specification 2, positive and statistically significant coefficients are observed for binary 
variables indicating the other reason category and the problem discovered by FSIS.  This latter 
finding is not consistent with findings in the count equation discussed above.  However, this 
finding may be reasonable if we consider that the number of recalls initiated by the FSIS is 
proportionally higher than the ones initiated by the company.  Although the estimates for 
binary variables indicating reasons E. coli and Listeria are not significant, the negative signs 
are expected since recalls for these reasons are more likely to be covered, as mentioned before, 
when compared with recalls for mislabeling.  
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According to Cameron and Trivedi (1998), the goodness of fit of the count data model is 
considered by comparing the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values, with a lower value of 
AIC indicating a better fit.  For the subsample, the fit of the model is similar for specification1 
and 2.  The AIC value is slightly smaller in specification 2.  However Schwartz’s Bayesian 
information criterion (SBC) is slightly smaller in specification 1.  Thus there is no conclusive 
evidence about the superiority of specification 1 over specification 2. 
It is worth pointing out that the dispersion parameters (alpha) in table 5.1 are significant.  
According to the UCLA Academic Technology Services, Statistical Consulting Group (2011), 
an alpha value of zero indicates that the Poisson model is appropriate.  This also means that the 
ZINB is nested within the ZIP (Bilgic, Florkowski, and Akbay 2010).  In my models the alpha 
values are significantly different than zero which suggests that the ZINB is the appropriate 
model.  For that reason, marginal effects are shown only for the ZINB model (as seen in table 
5.3 and table 5.6).  However, I provide the analysis for ZIP as well in table 5.2 for comparison 
purposes and to assess the robustness of my findings. 
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Table 5.2. Zero-inflated Poisson models for primary article counts in the first week of the recall. 
  Full  Sample n=1192  Sample with non-missing discovery measures n=780 
  Specification 1  Specification 1 Specification 2 
Parameter Estimate t ratio  Estimate t ratio Estimate t ratio 
Count Equation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept -4.153*** -7.530  -3.922*** -8.300 -4.066*** -10.270 
Logarithm of pounds 0.250*** 5.470  0.257*** 6.870 0.259*** 8.290 
Reason – E.coli 1.572*** 7.270  1.144*** 6.130 0.847*** 4.290 
Reason – Listeria 1.489*** 6.830  1.094*** 4.950 0.825*** 4.130 
Reason – Other 1.308*** 5.400  0.360* 1.640 0.583*** 2.620 
Reason – Other Micro 2.115*** 8.840  1.948*** 7.740 1.501*** 3.940 
Discovered – FSIS        0.514*** 3.040 
Discovered – Other Gov.        0.397** 2.420 
Zero Equation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept -0.901 -0.390  1.446 1.320 -3.081 -0.930 
Logarithm of pounds -0.151*** -2.830  -0.297*** -3.990 -0.288*** -5.390 
Reason – E.coli 1.929 1.080  0.717 1.120 -0.279 -0.520 
Reason – Listeria 1.975 1.050  0.414 0.570 -0.658 -1.190 
Reason – Other 2.936 1.520  -0.22 -0.180 1.268** 2.040 
Reason – Other Micro 3.271* 1.740  2.083*** 2.950 1.406* 1.830 
Discovered – FSIS         5.650* 1.870 
Discovered – Other Gov.        4.59 1.520 
AIC   1645  
 
1196 
 
1190 
SBC   1706  
 
1252 
 
1265 
Log likelihood -810.624  
 
-585.978 
 
-579.052 
Optimization Method   Newton-Raphson  
 
Newton-Raphson 
 
Newton-Raphson 
* significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at 1% level.
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Table 5.3 displays the marginal effects for the ZINB model for article counts of primary 
coverage during the first week after the recall announcement.  With the exception of the full 
sample, the marginal effects are positive, which indicates that an increase in the explanatory 
variable increases the likelihood of having more articles published by the AP, keeping all other 
values constant.  The marginal effects were computed in two different ways.  For the 
continuous variable, which in this study is the volume of product recalled, the following 
formula was used: 
(       )   
           
   
Where   is a column vector of coefficients from the zero model (probit equation),   is the 
normal CDF,   is a column vector of coefficients from the count data model (negative 
binomial),   is the normal PDF, and   is a row vector of regressors evaluated at the sample 
mean.  For the binary independent variables, the marginal effects were calculated using the 
following formula: 
(        ) 
    (        ) 
    
Where    has the binary variable in question held at a value of 1 and each other variable set at 
the sample mean and    has the binary variable in question held at a value of zero and each 
other element set to the sample mean. 
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Table 5.3. Marginal effects for primary article counts in the first week of the recall. 
  Full  Sample n=1192   Sample with non-missing discovery measures n=780 
  Specification 1   Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 
Parameter Marginal Effect   Marginal Effect Marginal Effect Marginal Effect 
Logarithm of pounds 0.104   0.12 0.0201 0.121 
Reason – E.coli -0.074   0.362 -0.0047 0.425 
Reason – Listeria -0.064   0.402 0.0098 0.422 
Reason – Other -0.244   0.175 0.0286 0.133 
Reason – Other Micro -0.291   0.021 -0.0232 0.725 
Discovered – FSIS     -0.4052 -0.231 
Discovered – Other Gov.     0.2293 0.068 
Monday 
    
0.107 
Tuesday 
    
0.026 
Wednesday 
    
0.043 
Thursday 
    
-0.077 
Weekend         -0.062 
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Estimates for the ZIP model in table 5.2 are similar to estimates for the ZINB model in 
terms of their signs and magnitudes.  There are, however, some observable differences.  In the 
zero equation for the full sample, the logarithm of pounds and indicator variable for recalls 
caused by contamination with other microorganisms are statistically significant, even though 
the estimate values do not differ meaningfully in magnitude.  Similarly, in specification 2, the 
binary variable for recalls discovered by other government entities in the count equation and 
binary variable for recalls caused by other microorganism in the zero equation are both 
statistically significant.  The intercept values of the zero equation of specification 1 in the 
subsample (n=780) loses its significance in the ZIP as opposed to the ZINB.  Overall model fit 
statistics are also similar between tables 5.1 and 5.2.  AIC and SBC values, however, are 
smaller in the ZINB models which indicates that ZINB models provide a better fit.  This is to 
be expected because of the significant dispersion parameters that suggest the negative binomial 
is the more appropriate model. 
 
Total Primary Coverage 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 estimates for specifications 1 and 2 for the ZINB and ZIP models 
respectively when the dependent variable is total primary coverage article counts.  Again, the 
majority, if not all, of the estimates in the count equations show statistical significance while 
only a few estimates are significant in the zero equation. 
In the count equations presented in table 5.4 all estimates are positive, except for the 
intercepts.  With exception of the indicator variable for other microorganisms in specification 2 
all estimates are statistically significant as well.  The interpretation of these estimates is 
analogous to that described above.  For example, the results suggest that recalls for E. coli, 
 51 
Listeria, and other microorganism receive more coverage than recalls for mislabeling (the base 
category).  In the zero equation, the logarithm of pounds exhibits a consistent negative sign 
across samples and specifications, and as explained above this is as would be expected if larger 
recalls are more likely to be covered by the Newswire.  For all the specifications, the dispersion 
parameter is significantly different than zero, which favors the ZINB over the ZIP.  This 
implication can also be noticed when comparing the values of the AIC between tables 5.4 and 
5.5 (for the reasons earlier described). 
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Table 5.4. Zero-inflated negative binomial models for total primary article counts. 
  Full  Sample n=1192  Sample with non-missing discovery measures n=780 
  Specification 1  Specification 1 Specification 2 
Parameter Estimate t ratio  Estimate t ratio Estimate t ratio 
Count Equation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept -4.730*** -9.390  -5.003*** -9.550 -5.027*** -10.900 
Logarithm of pounds 0.305*** 6.950  0.353*** 7.840 0.346*** 9.060 
Reason – E.coli 1.704*** 7.770  1.338*** 6.460 1.066*** 4.730 
Reason – Listeria 1.577*** 7.800  1.369*** 6.820 1.139*** 5.400 
Reason – Other 0.658** 2.050  0.578*** 2.670 0.765*** 3.250 
Reason – Other Micro 0.945** 2.270  0.940** 2.170 0.775 1.450 
Discovered – FSIS        0.398** 2.040 
Discovered – Other Gov.        0.492** 2.340 
Zero Equation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 0.908 0.430  1.808 1.310 -3.859 -1.000 
Logarithm of pounds -0.352** -2.030  -0.417*** -4.000 -0.341*** -3.410 
Reason – E.coli 1.283 1.120  0.741 0.790 -0.384 -0.450 
Reason – Listeria 1.328 1.240  0.512 0.600 -0.643 -0.800 
Reason – Other 1.635 1.080  -0.491 -0.420 1.931** 2.360 
Reason – Other Micro 0.978 0.320  0.876 0.640 0.697 0.480 
Discovered – FSIS         6.473** 1.990 
Discovered – Other Gov.        3.477 0.620 
Alpha 1.199*** 4.460  0.744*** 4.440 0.654*** 4.040 
AIC   1878  
 
1343 
 
1333 
SBC   1944  
 
1404 
 
1412 
Log likelihood -925.95  
 
-658.68 
 
-649.35 
Optimization method   Double Dogleg  
 
Newton-Raphson 
 
Newton-Raphson 
* significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at 1% level. 
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Table 5.5. Zero-inflated Poisson models for total primary article counts. 
  Full  Sample n=1192  Sample with non-missing discovery measures n=780 
  Specification 1  Specification 1 Specification 2 
Parameter Estimate t ratio  Estimate t ratio Estimate t ratio 
Count Equation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept -6.379*** -10.750  -6.553*** -10.080 -6.445*** -10.720 
Logarithm of pounds 0.471*** 9.080  0.489*** 8.570 0.462*** 9.770 
Reason – E.coli 1.602*** 5.070  1.442*** 4.250 1.059*** 3.620 
Reason – Listeria 1.211*** 3.920  1.139*** 3.490 0.937*** 2.980 
Reason – Other 1.025*** 3.140  0.825** 2.480 0.931*** 2.790 
Reason – Other Micro 1.210*** 3.430  1.341*** 3.630 0.776* 1.650 
Discovered – FSIS        0.442** 1.960 
Discovered – Other Gov.        0.913*** 3.580 
Zero Equation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept -1.806** -2.510  -3.066** -2.220 -3.21 -1.100 
Logarithm of pounds 0.092 1.320  0.124 0.760 0.039 0.320 
Reason – E.coli -0.141 -0.250  0.242 0.140 0.271 0.110 
Reason – Listeria -5.354*** -8.180  -4.673** -2.480 -4.452* -1.950 
Reason – Other 0.894* 1.860  1.059 0.820 1.807 0.750 
Reason – Other Micro 0.696 1.260  1.529 1.050 1.502 0.590 
Discovered – FSIS         1.383** 2.310 
Discovered – Other Gov.        1.248* 1.950 
AIC   2125  
 
1561 
 
1518 
SBC   2186  
 
1617 
 
1593 
N   1192  
 
780 
 
780 
Log likelihood -1050  
 
-768.566 
 
-743.181 
Optimization method   Newton-Raphson  
 
Newton-Raphson 
 
Newton-Raphson 
* significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at 1% level. 
 54 
In table 5.5, findings are not much different than those presented earlier for coverage during 
the first week of the recall.  However, two findings warrant mention.  The first is the estimates 
in the zero equation for the logarithm of pounds.  These are not significant in the ZIP models 
but are in the ZINB models.  The second outcome is the coefficient for the indicator variable 
for Listeria, also in the zero equation.  In all the specifications in table 5.5, the estimates are 
negative and significant, and display a large magnitude in comparison to result presented in 
table 5.4 and earlier for coverage during the first week of the recall.  
Table 5.6 presents the marginal effect for the ZINB model.  Specification 3 did not 
converge, and therefore the marginal effects listed are for specification 1 and 2.  The values 
were calculated following the same above formulae for continuous and binary variables. 
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Table 5.6. Marginal effects for total primary article counts. 
  Full Sample n=1192   Sample with non-missing discovery measures n=780 
  Specification 1   Specification 1 Specification 2 
Parameter Marginal Effect   Marginal Effect Marginal Effect 
Logarithm of pounds 0.126   0.141 0.1387 
Reason – E.coli 0.549   0.596 0.5799 
Reason – Listeria 0.436   0.618 0.6008 
Reason – Other 0.000   0.269 0.3266 
Reason – Other Micro 0.218   0.361 0.4403 
Discovered – FSIS     -0.1366 
Discovered – Other Gov.     0.2192 
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Models Adding the Day of the Week Variable 
Results for the models in which the day of the week variables were included (specification 
3) are shown in tables 5.7 and 5.8.  Table 5.7 presents results when the dependent variable is 
the number of primary coverage articles within the first week of recall announcement.  Table 
5.8 presents results for models in which the dependent variable is total primary coverage article 
counts, however only the ZIP model is presented due to convergence issues experienced with 
the ZINB
4
, as mentioned before.  For all of the models, the omitted variable for the day of the 
week was Friday to make it easier to assess the possible evidence of strategically using Friday 
announcements to limit negative publicity. 
As shown in table 5.7, we find no evidence that Friday announcements provide any 
advantage as none of the day of the week variables are significantly different from Friday in 
either the count or zero equations of the model.  Other coefficient estimates are similar to those 
reported earlier for specification 2 of tables 5.1 and table 5.2. 
In table 5.8, estimates for Wednesday in the count equation and Tuesday in the zero 
equation are statistically significant.  These indicate that Wednesday recalls receive more 
coverage relative to Friday recalls and that Tuesday recalls are less likely than Friday recalls to 
receive zero article counts.  However, when combining these findings with the ones shown in 
table 5.7, the coefficient estimates for the day of the week present weak evidence.  For this 
reason, conclusions based on this finding may be speculative due to the longer-run nature of 
this particular dependent variable.  When comparing the results in table 5.8 with those 
presented earlier in table 5.5 for specification 2, the estimates are quite different in both 
                                                             
4
  When the number of total primary coverage articles was used as the dependent variable, 
results could not be obtained for the ZINB model due to convergence problems such as the “the 
Hessian matrix is singular.”  Each available optimization method within the COUNTREG 
procedure was unsuccessful.  
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magnitude and statistical significance for both the count and zero equations.  This, coupled with 
the significant dispersion parameters reported earlier suggests further that findings based on the 
ZIP model of table 5.8 should be viewed with caution. 
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Table 5.7. Models for primary article counts during the first week of the recall including 
controls for day of the week (specification 3). 
  Sample with non-missing discovery measures n=780 
  ZIP ZINB 
Parameter Estimate t ratio Estimate t ratio 
Count Equation 
 
 
 
 
Intercept -4.163*** -9.420 -4.044*** -10.580 
Logarithm of pounds 0.273*** 7.300 0.262*** 8.500 
Reason – E.coli 0.802*** 3.420 0.784*** 3.190 
Reason – Listeria 0.757*** 3.220 0.778*** 3.410 
Reason – Other 0.542** 2.220 0.524*** 2.260 
Reason – Other Micro 1.702*** 4.940 1.373*** 2.650 
Discovered – FSIS 0.431** 2.360 0.490*** 3.120 
Discovered – Other Gov. 0.353** 1.990 0.395** 2.000 
Monday 0.212 0.930 0.236 1.070 
Tuesday 0.091 0.400 0.061 0.260 
Wednesday 0.289 1.190 0.1 0.460 
Thursday -0.217 -1.080 -0.197 -0.900 
Weekend -0.15 -0.720 -0.161 -0.800 
Zero Equation 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 0.152 0.160 -1.842 -0.760 
Logarithm of pounds -0.263*** -3.480 -0.307*** -4.440 
Reason – E.coli -0.405 -0.530 -0.369 -0.450 
Reason – Listeria -1.003 -1.300 -0.94 -1.300 
Reason – Other 1.051* 1.880 1.216* 1.940 
Reason – Other Micro 1.522* 1.880 1.303 1.520 
Discovered – FSIS 2.269*** 3.040 4.753** 2.170 
Discovered – Other Gov. 1.055 1.100 3.5 1.340 
Monday -0.173 -0.270 -0.264 -0.430 
Tuesday 0.144 0.240 0.08 0.120 
Wednesday 0.674 1.170 0.311 0.600 
Thursday -0.119 -0.150 -0.173 -0.210 
Weekend -0.594 -1.130 -0.769 -1.470 
Alpha     0.139* 1.850 
AIC   1199 
 
1196 
SBC   1320 
 
1322 
Log likelihood -573.571 
 
-571.019 
Optimization method   Newton-Raphson 
 
Newton-Raphson Ridge 
* significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at 1% level. 
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Table 5.8. A zero-inflated Poisson model total primary coverage article  
counts including controls for day of the week (specification 3). 
  Sample with non-missing discovery measures n=780 
Parameter Estimate t ratio 
Count Equation 
 
 
Intercept -6.242*** -4.220 
Logarithm of pounds 0.456*** 2.650 
Reason – E.coli 0.598 1.390 
Reason – Listeria 0.49 0.640 
Reason – Other 0.521 0.900 
Reason – Other Micro 0.961 1.450 
Discovered – FSIS 0.467 0.600 
Discovered – Other Gov. 0.635*** 1.850 
Monday 0.312 1.050 
Tuesday 1.003 1.470 
Wednesday 0.636*** 2.880 
Thursday -0.283 -1.100 
Weekend 0.124 0.540 
Zero Equation 
 
 
Intercept -2.559 -0.200 
Logarithm of pounds 0.048 0.040 
Reason – E.coli -1.86 -0.460 
Reason – Listeria -2.085 -0.230 
Reason – Other 0.359 0.510 
Reason – Other Micro 0.015 0.010 
Discovered – FSIS 1.778** 2.320 
Discovered – Other Gov. 1.058 1.480 
Monday 0.326 0.180 
Tuesday 1.49** 2.230 
Wednesday 1.411 1.010 
Thursday -0.983 -0.310 
Weekend -5.48*** -2.750 
AIC   1440 
SBC   1561 
Log likelihood -693.891 
Optimization method   Newton-Raphson 
* significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at 1% level. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
In this thesis, I used recall information from the USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service 
(FSIS) and combined it with articles appearing in the Associated Press (AP) Newswire to arrive 
at article counts resulting from meat and poultry recalls from 1982 and 2009.  My overall 
objective was to assess the characteristics that make a meat and/or poultry recall event more 
likely to receive coverage in the news media. 
My results were based on count data models, specifically the zero-inflated negative 
binomial model and the zero-inflated Poisson model.  These results suggest that recalls 
involving larger volumes are more likely to be covered by the AP and also receive more 
coverage.  This finding is consistent with my a priori hypothesis.  There is also evidence that 
product recalls due to serious microbial pathogens are more likely to be covered as well.  This 
is also consistent with the hypothesized relationship.  I find little evidence that the day of the 
week on which the recall was issued affects either the likelihood or amount of coverage.  Thus 
it is unlikely that recalling companies can strategically time recall announcements to 
correspond to slower periods in the weekly news cycle. 
Given the FSIS records, I could not consistently identify recalls that were linked to 
outbreaks of illnesses due to consumption of meat or poultry products contaminated with 
pathogens.  Thus outbreak is not considered as an explanatory variable in the models.  However 
there is some evidence that outbreaks lead to increased media coverage.  When recalls are for 
E. coli, Listeria or contamination with other microbiological hazards article counts were higher 
and outbreaks are generally linked to recalls for these causes.  While I did not systematically 
record outbreak content contained in the AP stories, mention of outbreaks was frequent, which 
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also suggests that outbreaks lead to increased coverage.  The results also imply that recalls 
discovered by FSIS, when covered, generally receive more coverage than recalls discovered by 
the company or other governmental entities.  My suspicion is that number of outbreaks and the 
magnitude and severity of illnesses are important variables in predicting the intensity of media 
coverage.  In the regression context this means the list of explanatory variables is incomplete 
for the models I estimated in this thesis.  This implies that the results herein are intermediate 
estimates and that the conclusions drawn are certainly not definitive but awaits further 
investigation.  Such investigation needs additional exploration of data from the FSIS and/or 
CDC on outbreak intensity and severity. 
The study has some additional limitations.  First, although the AP is a comprehensive 
newsgathering organization, it is not a comprehensive indicator of coverage.  In addition, as 
media consumption habits change, the AP Newswire may have become a less comprehensive 
indicator of coverage over time.  My study period overlapped growth in cable news 
programming and the advent and growth of internet news sources but these other sources may 
depend on the AP Newswire to some degree. 
The combined dataset used in this research included AP articles coded as primarily or 
secondarily covering a recall event.  However, the models were estimated solely using the 
primary covered articles.  Although primary coverage is probably the most important and 
interesting information in terms of media coverage and public accessibility, a different coding 
system, which would include all the articles that mention a recall event, may present some 
different results because they would be analyzing different aspects of recalls. 
Additional future research should emphasize the limitations listed above.  If consumer 
safety is the major point of any product recall then research evaluating in which contexts 
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consumers are most likely to receive recall announcements would be important in terms of 
regulations and food safety policies. 
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